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Die nationale Sicherheit Sloweniens im neuen europäischen Umfeld 
Bericht des BIOst Nr. 12/1997 
Kurzfassung 
Vorbemerkung 
Als neukonstituierter Nationalstaat steht Slowenien vor der Aufgabe, Konzepte, Richtlinien 
und Institutionen für die nationale Sicherheit auszuarbeiten. Das geschieht unter den Bedin-
gungen eines jungen Staates in einem gewandelten Europa, weshalb nicht nur die eigenen au-
ßenpolitischen Erfahrungen und Grundsätze zu berücksichtigen sind, sondern ebenso die dy-
namischen Begleitumstände, die sich in vielfältigen Vorschlägen und Bemühungen um Inte-
gration nach Europa äußern. Nur vor diesem Hintergrund ist zu verstehen, wie Slowenien sich 
ein neues Netz für seine nationale Sicherheit knüpft, und ebenso lassen sich auf dieser Basis 
die slowenischen Bemühungen um Teilnahme am europäischen Integrationsprozeß und um 
Beitritt zur NATO und zur Europäischen Union verfolgen. 
Ergebnisse 
1. Bei der Festlegung eines Rahmens für die nationale Sicherheit muß Slowenien außer 
seinen eigenen Bedürfnissen auch die Entwicklungen im sich neu formierenden 
europäischen - und auch weltweiten - Sicherheitsumfeld im Auge behalten, denn das 
diesbezügliche politische Handeln und die Institutionen hängen per definitionem eng mit 
den internationalen Gegebenheiten zusammen. 
2. Seit der slowenischen Unabhängigkeit war es der einhellige Wunsch und das erklärte Ziel 
aller politischen Kräfte im Parlament, die gesellschaftlichen und politischen Institutionen 
des Landes grundlegend neu zu gestalten und das nationale Sicherheitssystem zu 
reformieren. Die Kernfrage, um die es dabei geht - Umorganisation der slowenischen 
Armee oder Entmilitarisierung des Landes - ist jedoch in der Regierung und in der 
Öffentlichkeit nach wie vor umstritten. 
3. Die neue slowenische Verfassung vom Dezember 1991 brachte sieben grundsätzliche 
Änderungen bezüglich des nationalen Sicherheitssystems mit sich. Dazu gehören eine 
entstehende parlamentarische Mehrparteiendemokratie, Gewaltenteilung zwischen der 
exekutiven, legislativen und judikativen Staatsgewalt, erweiterte Regierungskompetenzen 
in Fragen des Militärhaushalts und der militärischen Aktivitäten, Umorganisation des 
Verteidigungsministeriums sowie Konsolidierung der Armee, Abschaffung aller Gesetze, 
die dem Militär in sozialen und politischen Kernfragen Autonomie gewähren, sowie 
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Abschaffung aller militärischen "Fachschulen", die früher die Stelle von öffentlichen 
höheren Schulen und Universitäten eingenommen hatten. 
4. Mit diesen Reformen wird das einstige privilegierte Verhältnis zwischen dem Militär und 
der führenden Regierungspartei beseitigt, und es findet keine politische und religiöse Dis-
kriminierung im militärischen Leben mehr statt. Darüber hinaus wirken sich die Reformen 
in der Weise aus, daß das slowenische Militär einen repräsentativeren Querschnitt der 
Gesellschaft bildet, was Geschlecht, Religion und soziale Herkunft betrifft. 
5. Das Militär steht jetzt nach dem Muster entwickelter parlamentarischer Systeme 
vollständig unter ziviler Kontrolle und es ist, was den Einblick durch das Parlament, die 
Medien, die Wissenschaft und die Öffentlichkeit betrifft, transparenter geworden. Die 
Neuorganisation sorgt auch dafür, daß die Militärführung der obersten repräsentativen 
Macht der Nation unterstellt ist und daß alle Entscheidungen, die die nationale Sicherheit 
betreffen, vom Parlament getroffen werden, wobei sich die Rolle des ansonsten 
entpolitisierten Militärs auf die Ausführung dieser Beschlüsse beschränkt. 
6. Probleme haben sich dagegen beim Wandel der Beziehungen zwischen dem zivilen und 
dem militärischen Bereich in Slowenien ergeben, soweit es um den Aufbau des neuen 
nationalen Sicherheitsrahmens geht. Ursache dafür sind Verzögerungen bei der 
Verabschiedung neuer Gesetze und unklare Verantwortlichkeit der staatlichen 
Rechtsinstitutionen gegenüber dem Parlament und der Öffentlichkeit in Fragen der 
nationalen Sicherheit. Dies wiederum ist symptomatisch für die widersprüchliche und 
unausgereifte slowenische Politik, deren neu entstehende Elite noch immer untereinander 
zerstritten ist und in der es den zivilen Leistungsträgern der Gesellschaft noch immer an 
nennenswertem Einfluß fehlt. 
7. Auf der internationalen Ebene setzt Slowenien auf Kooperation und weniger auf Wettbe-
werb als vorrangige Strategie zur Lösung internationaler Probleme. In der unmittelbaren 
Nachbarschaft hat sich das Land energisch bemüht, die Beziehungen zu den angrenzenden 
Staaten zu verbessern. Diese Bemühungen sind zwar im großen und ganzen erfolgreich, 
aber zwei wichtige Fragen sind bislang ungelöst: italienische "Optionen" auf Eigentums-
rechte in Slowenien und Grenzfragen mit Kroatien. 
8. Allem politischen Gezänk und einer gewissen öffentlichen Unsicherheit zum Trotz besteht 
allgemeine Einigkeit darüber, daß Slowenien den Weg zur Integration nach Europa, und 
hier vor allem in die NATO und die EU, beschreiten soll. Das ist das vorrangige 
außenpolitische Ziel des Landes, mit dem es sich die Pflicht auferlegt, zwischenstaatliche 
Konflikte friedlich beizulegen, aber auch, sich im Falle eines Angriffs - notfalls allein - zu 
verteidigen. Slowenien hat das NATO-Programm "Partnerschaft für den Frieden" (PfP) 
nachdrücklich befürwortet, und die für die Verteidigung Verantwortlichen bekunden 
höchstes Interesse an dessen Möglichkeiten zur Schulung und Ausbildung von Offizieren, 
zur Modernisierung des Personalwesens und seine Anpassung an die NATO-Konvention, 
zum Aufbau eines NATO-kompatiblen Kommunikationssystems, zur Teilnahme an 
gemeinsamen Übungen und zur Aufstellung einer militärischen Einheit für internationale 
Zusammenarbeit. Das slowenische Parlament hat Gesetze zur weiteren Unterstützung der 
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NATO und des PfP-Programms verabschiedet, durch die Mittel zum Ausbau der 
Streitkräfte und zur Sicherstellung der NATO-Kompatibilität der Ausrüstung bereitgestellt 
werden. 
9. Den Nutzen einer Mitarbeit am PfP-Programm sieht Slowenien in einem verbesserten Si-
cherheitsgefühl für das Land, in der Teilnahme an gemeinsamer operativer Planung, in der 
Entwicklung einer modernen NATO-kompatiblen Verteidigungsstruktur und militärischen 
Verfahrensweise, und in einer späteren Einbeziehung in eine integrierte gesamteuropäische 
militärische und politische Struktur. 
10.Der slowenischen Öffentlichkeit ist bewußt, daß im Zuge der Integration und Entspannung 
in Europa eine reale Möglichkeit zur Reform der NATO und zur Stärkung ihrer 
sicherheitspolitischen Rolle besteht. Außerdem wünscht sie schnellstmöglich über die Vor- 
und Nachteile einer NATO-Mitgliedschaft Sloweniens informiert zu werden. 
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Introduction 
Contemporary national security can be defined theoretically as a state of security in which a 
nation-state’s balanced physical, spiritual, psychical and material existence is ensured in 
relation to other communities.1 
It encompasses the following basic elements: existence and maintenance of territorial 
integrity (including airspace and territorial waters), influence and status in the international 
community, economic development and the protection of life and property of its inhabitants. 
Therefore, the national security in the present day world is generally determined by two sets 
of factors which derive from: 
a) the internal situation of a nation-state, and 
b) the international security environment (sub-regional, regional and/or global). 
Regarding the internal aspect, Slovenia, as a newly established nation-state, has accomplished 
some of the essential changes important for a successful transition from an authoritarian 
system into a democratic socio-political system and market economy. One of the fundamental 
issues in this process of democratisation concerns the formation of a new national security 
framework and, within this, the regulation of civil-military relations based on democratic 
principles ensuring the supremacy of civil authority and its control over the military and 
national security issues. 
The new Slovene national security identity was shaped at a time when a new European 
security environment came into being characterised by the following elements: end of the 
bipolar division of Europe, general détente among the great powers, withdrawal of Russian 
troops from Central Europe (and the Slovene vicinity), strengthening of co-operation between 
NATO and East and Central European countries, escalating complexity of socio-economic, 
national and other issues in the post-socialist countries, military-political crises in the Balkans 
and renewed competition among great powers for new spheres of influence in Eastern, 
Central and South-eastern Europe inspired primarily by economic interests and security 
concerns. These changes and processes have ushered in a new European security climate 
which stimulates co-operation and multilateralism in decision-making with regard to 
European political and security affairs. The search for a common and comprehensive 
European security order originates from the awareness that modern security is a complex 
mixture of ingredients entailing various dimensions of social life, such as economic, political, 
humanitarian, ecological and military considerations. Furthermore, peaceful conflict 
resolution may well become untenable if a future military crisis assumes an international 
aspect and Slovenia's concomitant military commitments demand resort to military means. 
                                                 
1  Anton Grizold, The Concept of National Security in the Contemporary World. International Journal on 
World Peace, No. 3 (1994), p. 39. 
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The limitations of Slovenia's security policy become more apparent when they are viewed in 
the light of European integration processes as well as against the background of newly devel-
oped military technology which can be easily used or rather misused to cause mass 
destruction. 
The purpose of this essay is to analyse Slovenia’s endeavours so far to shape its new national 
security framework after independence. It examines both internal efforts to create state and 
social structures, politics and civil-military relations along democratic lines, and Slovenia’s 
international attempts to integrate itself in the West, especially in the EU and NATO. The 
analysis will also include the reaction of public opinion to Slovenia’s policy goal of gaining 
NATO membership. 
1. The Creation of a New Slovene National Security Framework 
On June 25, 1991, the Slovene Parliament passed the Declaration of Independence of Slove-
nia, by means of which Slovenia was politically and legally obliged to take over all functions 
of state authority on its territory. The day after the proclamation, the Yugoslav People's Army 
(YPA) intervened in Slovenia with armed troops and air power. However, the employment of 
the YPA as a “super police” proved to be inefficient. As a multinational conscript army it was 
unable to establish the necessary cohesion and motivation to fight, which is why the lower 
units of YPA disintegrated as soon as they engaged with Slovene Territorial Defense (TD) 
units.2 
When the YPA departed from Slovenia in October 1991, the supervision of Slovene territory 
was taken over by the Slovene TD units and police forces. From that point onwards, the ne-
cessity to develop a new national security framework has been intensified. It is worthwhile to 
mention that after the first multi-party elections in Slovenia (in 1990) the need for the Slovene 
liberation process to be regulated by laws has become increasingly urgent. It is clear that the 
broadest common interest of all the new parliamentary political parties was a thorough 
change of the social order, including the development of a new national security system. The 
latter aspect was in fact emphasised in the programmes of most Slovene political parties. 
Most party programmes spoke of military organisation, even though the notion of a 
demilitarised Slovenia had been strongly advocated before the elections. The twin poles in 
this debate stood for extreme and diametrically opposite positions, thus undermining the 
practical application of either of them. By presenting as the only alternative a new Slovene 
army or a Slovene demilitarised zone, the parties caused schisms within themselves, as well 
as in the public opinion.3 
                                                 
2  The Territorial Defense was at that time a militia army (composed of a small core of professionals and large 
reserve units), organised on the level of individual Yugoslav republics, communes and some larger 
enterprises. According to the Yugoslav constitution (1974) TD was one of two constituent parts of the 
Yugoslav armed forces (the other being the YPA). 
3  Anton Grizold, Civilian Supervision of the Military in Slovenia. The Public, Vol. 1, No. 4 (1994), p. 90. 
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After the first multi-party elections the new Slovene parliament introduced sweeping changes 
in the legal system thus opening the way for abolishing the inherited authoritarian political 
system. The adoption of a new Slovene constitution in December 1991 established the widest 
possible legal framework for implementing the following changes affecting also the Slovene 
national security system: 
1. the legalisation of a multi-party parliamentary democracy is put into effect; 
2. the principle of the division of power between executive, legislative and judiciary is en-
shrined by the constitution; 
3. the governmental authority over matters of national security, especially defense was in-
creased. The government both proposes all defense expenditure, as well as defines and 
regulates the defense capacity of the military; 
4. all executive responsibilities relating to defense are invested in a single body, the Defense 
Ministry. The General Staff of the Slovene Army as the highest-ranking organ of the Slo-
vene military, has itself become a constituent part of the Defense Ministry, and its Chief of 
Staff answers directly to the Defense Minister; 
5. the Slovene Army is now the only regular military force in the state and combines 
elements of a standing army and of dispersed territorial units; 
6. all laws which had enabled the army to regulate its affairs autonomously (e.g. education, 
social security and health care) have been abolished. The status of professional soldiers, 
officers, NCOs is now the same as that of civil servants with some exceptions, such as the 
prohibition to strike, that relate only to the special nature of a military organisation; 
7. all former special military schools have been closed. Professional soldiers are now re-
cruited from high schools and universities before receiving their professional military 
education at a new military educational centre which falls under the responsibility of the 
Defense Ministry.4 
These reforms at the level of both the political system and national security prepared the stage 
for a qualitative change of civil-military relations in Slovenia. The former symbiotic relation-
ship between the military and the communist party was abolished the moment professional 
military personnel were no longer required to be party members. All party activities were pro-
hibited while an end was put to religion related restrictions and discrimination within the 
military. The entire military corps has become more socially representative from the 
standpoint of gender, social origin and religion, and more nationally and culturally 
homogenous. Professional officer and NCO ranks are more accessible to women. The military 
is now under strict civilian control; the Defense Minister is a civilian who answers directly to 
parliament and government. The national security system as a whole is more transparent and 
accessible to parliamentary scrutiny, mass media, empirical science and to public criticism.5 
                                                 
4  Anton Grizold, ibid. p. 91. 
5  Anton Bebler, Slovenian Territorial Defense. International Defense Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 (1993), p. 67. 
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Unlike the previous system in Yugoslavia, relations between Slovene civilian and military 
institutions are now organised similarly to those of developed parliamentary states. This 
design ensures that: 
− in the division between civil and military power, the former prevails over the latter; 
− military leadership is in the hands of the highest representative power in government; 
− all decisions concerning national security are made by the parliament; 
− the military is restricted to a purely executive role; 
− the military is de-politicised. 
Despite the positive evolution of civil-military relations and of the whole national security 
framework in Slovenia, certain problems have arisen slowing down the development of a 
democratic system. 
These problems primarily derive from two sources: 
1. incomplete establishment of an overall legal order in the Slovene state since many new 
laws affecting the rearrangement of various fields of Slovene public life are still to be 
adopted under the new constitution; 
2. different degrees of institutionalisation concerning national security arrangements, and in-
sufficient accountability of legal organs to the parliament and the public. 
These facts indicate a state of vagueness and ambiguity regarding the responsibility of state 
institutions and the new order of law in matters of national security. This is apparent in the 
way that state organs fail to fulfil their peacetime function of national security. Such 
difficulties arise presently in Slovenia where the situation is characterised by a high degree of 
politicisation, a marked failure by the civil society and its professional associations to 
influence vital political decisions and disruptive splits within the newly emerging Slovene 
political elite which infests political life with personal and party squabbling over 
irregularities, ideology and faux pas. The fact is that since independence the Slovene political 
sphere has become more fragmented and ridden with antagonism.6 
In sum, the most problematic element in the process of transformation from authoritarian to 
democratic socio-political structures, including the creation of a new Slovene national 
security framework, is the present political elite that is unable and/or unwilling to overcome 
divisive tendencies dating back to partisan politics during the war and subsequent regime 
history. 
2. Basic Elements of the New European Security Environment 
The end of the Cold War triggered real tectonic movements in international relations (break-
up of communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe, disintegration of the former Soviet 
                                                 
6  Anton Grizold, Civilian Supervision of the Military in Slovenia, p. 92. 
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Union and Yugoslavia, dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, reunification of Germany etc.). From 
the point of view of security, various changes occurring after the revolutionary changes of 
1989 eased to some extent international tensions and improved the overall security in Europe. 
The existing international security organisations (UN, NATO, WEU and OSCE) are thus fac-
ing new challenges. In the changed international environment they need to find themselves a 
new legitimacy founded on new assignments and have to set up new structures different from 
those determined by the Cold War and bipolar division of the world. 
In Europe we are at present witnessing a process of repolarisation in the political and military 
area as well as the formation of a multipolar world, both leading to a mixture of positive and 
negative consequences. A partly improved security climate elicited co-operation among Euro-
pean countries also with regard to the search for and the establishment of a common and inte-
grated European security system. At the same time, however, political, military, economic 
and social instability is growing throughout the continent. The cores of instability and danger 
in Europe can be found mainly in the area ranging from the former Soviet Union through 
Central Europe, the Balkans and further on to the Near and Middle East and to the Maghreb.7 
Since 1992 the military aspect of security in Europe was limited to the danger of rearmament, 
and in particular the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Economic aspects of security be-
came of increased importance representing a challenge as well as an opportunity for strength-
ening Europe’s political stability. Europe remains divided into two groups. On the one hand 
there is a group of economically prosperous countries with their external security guaranteed 
and on the other a group of mostly post-socialist countries in transition witnessing 
deteriorating socio-economic conditions marked by hyper-inflation, pauperisation and 
unemployment.8 The humanitarian aspect of the European security is also gaining in 
significance. New "artificial" minorities are being formed by streams of immigrants, refugees 
and asylum-seekers. Individual security is threatened by a new wave of xenophobia and 
racism. Violence against minorities became a way of expressing protest as people's 
expectations were not fulfilled.9 
In contemporary Europe, a wider concept of national and international security is gradually 
being implemented incorporating economic, political, social, humanitarian, environmental, 
military, etc. aspects. Within this concept an important position has been taken up by issues 
such as the protection of human rights and freedoms, democracy and the rule of law. 
Although the existing security organisations in Europe consider also non-military aspects of 
the European security, there has been a marked difference between great powers and small 
countries concerning their national security endeavours. The great powers are still focused on 
the military aspect of their national security (defense of borders, territorial waters and air 
space), whilst the smaller countries are much more concerned with the threat to their political, 
                                                 
7  Theodor Winkler, Central Europe and the Post-Cold War European Security Order, p. 33. In: K. Jacob (ed.), 
Central European Security Concerns: Bridge, Buffer or Barrier?, London 1993. 
8  Brigitte Sauerwein, European Security: The Institutional Challenge. International Defense Review, 26 (1), p. 
31. 
9  Brigitte Sauerwein, ibid. 
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economic and cultural autonomy. In present-day Europe the fight for autonomy remains an 
important component of the political reality of small countries.10 In any case, it is in the 
interest of each small country to formulate a wider concept of modern security, paying 
attention in the first place to non-military aspects of security since this is the only way by 
which they will become a sovereign and credible partner in their international relations. 
In their endeavours for peace, stability and security in today’s Europe not all small countries 
find themselves in the same position but can be divided into three groups: a group of small 
countries from Western Europe being full members of all or the majority of European institu-
tions; a group of small countries which co-operate with European institutions and are 
gradually gaining membership (in at least some of the institutions), and a group of small 
countries which are facing various difficulties in their rapprochement to the European 
institutions.11 The ranking of each individual country in one of the above groups in a way 
determines its chances of obtaining guarantees for their national security and for being able to 
associate themselves to the new European security order. In contemporary Europe, peace and 
security are assured by three factors, namely (1) by the strengthening of security 
organisations and an appropriate division of work among these (NATO, WEU, OSCE); (2) by 
the development of political and military co-operation among the countries through a network 
of bilateral and multilateral security dialogues; (3) by setting up mechanisms preventing inter-
state conflicts as well as intrinsic conflicts within each country, based on the values and 
experience of the previous development of the OSCE. 
The present European security environment contains the elements of peace, stability and se-
curity as well as elements of instability, insecurity and danger. This environment thus 
produces positive and negative effects on the security of smaller countries. 
Let us have a look at some positive effects of the European security environment on the secu-
rity of smaller countries: 
1. a general easing of tensions between the European great powers enabling a higher level of 
co-operation between the countries and peaceful conflict and dispute resolution and even-
tually decreasing danger of an outbreak of a large military conflict and a direct military 
threat to small counties. 
2. Smaller countries being able to co-operate with international security organisations on the 
basis of multilateral agreements. The latter guarantees them a certain influence on the 
political and security developments in Europe and an opportunity to avoid a too high 
dependence on only one organisation or country. 
3. The tendency toward regionalism in Europe opens new opportunities for smaller countries 
to co-operate in resolving regional security issues (for example, in the framework of the 
                                                 
10  H. Gartner and A. Sens, Small States and the Security Structures of Europe: The Search for Security after the 
Cold War, p. 182. In: Ingo Peters (ed.), New Security Challenges: The Adaptation of International 
Institutions. St. Martin's Press, New York 1996. 
11  H. Gartner and A. Sens, ibid. 
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Nordic Council, Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean, etc.). Al-
though in the framework of regional co-operation forums small countries cannot solve 
their basic security dilemmas, they can at least take part in consultations and try to create 
an appropriate political climate. 
4. The USA's participation in establishing the new European security order and its constant 
presence in Europe contributes to the security of small countries. By their presence in 
Europe the USA help balance various forms of special relations and factors (for example, 
French-German co-operation, special position of the European nuclear powers, special re-
lations between Great Britain and the USA, etc.) and alleviate constant fears of small 
countries of being overpowered by some stronger country or a group of them.12 
5. The strengthening of bilateral and multilateral military and political co-operation among 
the European countries. 
Among the negative elements affecting the security of smaller countries in the present-day 
European security environment we should point out the following: 
1. many small European countries face threats originating from their intrinsic development 
(for example, the majority of post-socialist countries), as well as from local threats based 
on long lasting regional conflicts and/or rivalry (for example, Croatia - Serbia, Greece - 
Turkey, Baltic republics, Moldavia - Russia); 
2. the aspects of European integration are not all positive, as integration causes also concern 
regarding an individual country's national sovereignty (not only in their politico-economic 
but also socio-cultural aspect), which holds true in particular for smaller countries; 
3. a resumed division of areas of interest among the great powers, and in particular in the 
Central Eastern and South Eastern part of Europe and in the Mediterranean; 
4. modernisation and professional approach in the armed forces mostly in strong and devel-
oped countries suggest that the use of force remains an important political instrument of 
modern countries. 
In short, the new European security arrangement is not simply a model of co-operative secu-
rity. It still contains numerous unknowns and also elements of the previous European security 
system. It is of paramount importance for smaller countries what kind of security regulation 
model is to be introduced in the future. The eventual development of the multipolar balance 
of power, for example, raises some dilemmas regarding the mechanisms for assuring the 
external aspect of security, a problem smaller countries have faced already in the past under 
the balance of power system. In former times, security mechanisms of smaller countries 
comprised predominantly bilateral and multilateral linkages and the policy of neutrality.13 We 
can learn form historic experience that alliances of smaller countries with great powers may 
                                                 
12  Theodor Winkler, op. cit., p. 28. 
13  Allen Sens, Small-State Security in Europe: Threats, Anxieties and Strategies after the Cold War, p. 83. In: 
Werner Bauwens, Armand Clesse & Olav F. Knudsen, Small States and the Security Challenge in the New 
Europe. Brassey’s. London. Washington, 1996. 
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create new enemies, are often unreliable and may even lead to the loss of autonomy regarding 
foreign and even internal policy. Furthermore, the policy of neutrality depends greatly on an 
favourable international environment ensured primarily by great powers, as well as on the 
readiness of countries to maintain neutrality at any cost. 
A possible concerted system of European security regulation would also not be the one most 
welcome by smaller countries. This system, by the definition alone, means the domination of 
great powers which would most probably soon abolish the participation of smaller countries 
in the decision making process regarding European security matters. 
Further economic-political integration and a highlighted importance of co-operation and mu-
tual confidence among the European countries as such do not guarantee the security of 
smaller countries. Although an integrative environment guarantees security against traditional 
sources of threat (based on the use of armed force), it causes at the same time greater 
vulnerability of and concern among small countries regarding: 
1. the preservation of economic-political autonomy, 
2. marginalisation in the European institutions and decision-making, 
3. concentration of integration benefits within a smaller group of countries, etc. 
The implementation of European security regulation based on the system of collective 
security would have on the normative level several advantages for small countries (for 
example, putting into effect the mechanisms for peaceful dispute resolution, chances for a 
formal co-operation of all members in the security related decision-making processes, 
commitments of great powers as defined in multilateral agreements, etc.). Actual practice, 
however, has proven that for example in the UN, implementing any of the collective security 
mechanisms depends most of all on the political will of great powers. 
We can conclude from the above that irrespective of the model of security regulation which is 
to be implemented in the future Europe, it will have positive as well as negative effects on the 
security of smaller countries. It is therefore of vital importance for smaller countries that in 
the framework of their national security policies they adhere to an integral modern security 
concept embodying military and non-military aspects of national security in the context of 
domestic and international environment. Only by consistent adherence to this concept will 
smaller countries become credible partners in international relations and will be able to ensure 
their own security by their own forces as well as by participating in wider security 
institutions. 
It is undoubtedly one of the principle common interests of smaller countries that the European 
security regulations continue to be founded on the principles of co-operation, peaceful dispute 
resolution and operation of multilateral institutions who in their endeavours for a common 
and integral security system complement each other and ensure the participation of each 
European country. 
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3. The International Aspect of Slovene National Security Policy 
Despite the fact that the newly emerging political elite in Slovenia has serious difficulties in 
reaching a clear consensus on key questions related to fundamental national interests, it is 
generally agreed that the strategic goal of Slovenia is to join the process of European 
integration and thereby become a full member of the EU and NATO as soon as possible. 
The responsibility of the Slovene state concerning national security is mainly outlined by the 
Resolution on the Principles of National Security in the Republic of Slovenia passed by the 
Slovene parliament (December 1993) which lists several considerable external and internal 
threats along with some main instruments for dealing with them. The resolution states 
Slovenia's commitment to the peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts and the reduction of 
heavy arms. However, if attacked, this resolution states, Slovenia would defend itself with 
arms, relying mainly on its own defense capabilities. The international aspect of Slovene 
peace time national security policy is based on the policy of defensive self-reliance on the one 
hand and on close association with NATO on the other. 
On April 11, 1996, the Slovene parliament passed another resolution stating that “the 
Republic of Slovenia wishes to ensure its fundamental security interest within the system of 
collective defense enabled by membership of NATO”. This document in fact indicates the 
achievement of a broad national consensus on the foundations of national security policy. The 
implementation of the Slovene foreign policy goals, the most important of which is 
Slovenia’s inclusion in the processes of European integration and collective security 
institutions, is based on the principles of confidence and mutual trust and co-operation instead 
of deterrence and hostile competition among states. In terms of security this means that the 
present Slovene establishment has chosen co-operation with other countries as an important 
means of problem solving. 
On the practical level Slovene governments strive to strengthen good neighbourly relations as 
a means of constructive foreign policy. Considering Slovenia’s relations with neighbouring 
countries one can conclude that in the last two years, Slovenia has accomplished several 
essential moves in order to improve its relations with neighbouring countries. As a whole 
these relations are good, although with Italy and Croatia some issues have yet to be resolved. 
While independent Slovenia has been improving friendly relations with Hungary and Austria 
ties with Italy and Croatia are rather more complicated. In 1994 the Italian government led by 
Mr. Berlusconi severed its relations with Slovenia, demanding a revision of the basic 
international treaty, which established the relations between Italy and Slovenia within the 
former Yugoslavia, and which was already acknowledged by the Italian government (1991-
1993). The current Italian demands negate their former agreement and involve property 
settlement for “optants” (i.e. the Italians who left Yugoslavia after the Second World War) in 
the Slovene processes of de-nationalisation and privatisation, and seek grant priority rights to 
the purchase of assets in Slovenia. This issue caused a split in the Slovene ruling political 
coalition and resulted in the foreign minister’s resignation. The new Italian government in 
1996 brings positive progress in settling the above mentioned issues satisfactorily for both 
sides. Efforts to resolve issues with Croatia, of which the most important is the question of the 
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Slovene-Croat border, have so far been rather inefficient mostly because both countries have 
set for their foreign policy orientations different priorities: Slovenia looks toward European 
integration, Croatia on the other hand toward a satisfactory end to the war on its territory. 
In the last two years Slovenia has made significant progress in terms of integration with the 
West, especially with the EU (it has an association agreement) and NATO. Since the latter 
occupies the centre stage in European security, expending its activity with new roles, 
missions and partners, it is understandable that Slovenia aims to become a NATO member. 
In January 1994, immediately after the NATO summit which formally introduced the Partner-
ship for Peace Programme (PfPP) the Slovene government declared its support for this pro-
gramme and revealed its intention to take part. In March 1994, Slovenia signed the 
Framework Document of the PfPP and, in July of the same year, it produced its Presentation 
Document. In May 1995, the Individual PfPP between Slovenia and NATO was adopted. The 
PfPP makes the prospects of both political and military co-operation with NATO much more 
tangible. The depth of co-operation in the PfPP differs in the various fields of activity, but the 
areas considered to be the most important for the emerging Slovene defense system are as 
follows: 
− The education and training of commissioned officers. The Slovene authorities believe the 
establishment of a completely autonomous educational system for military cadres is both 
irrational and uneconomical. They expect, therefore, to educate and train high-ranking 
military personnel to a large extent abroad. 
− Adapting the organisation of the military to modern standards. Since the Slovene defense 
system has not yet been completely developed, the Department of Defense wishes to intro-
duce standards and procedures which would ensure compatibility with NATO. 
− Creating a NATO-style command, control and information system which would be primar-
ily concerned with the implementation of search and rescue, relief and peace operations. 
− Participation in joint exercises and acquiring suitable experiences. 
− Establishing an international co-operation unit. The Slovene Department of Defense 
formed in 1996 a professional unit of the Slovene Army ranked at the battalion level which 
will be specially trained for PfPP activities. 
Such co-operation in the PfPP is important for Slovenia as a small country for the following 
reasons: 
1. The psychological effect of improved security upon the country of knowing that in 
consolidating its national defense, Slovenia can depend upon a larger system of alliances. 
2. Slovenia is able to participate in joint operational planning via the Slovene mission to 
NATO and via liaison officers in the PfPP Co-ordination Cell in Mons. 
3. In developing new military-defense structures and procedures , a certain level of 
functional, structural, technological and military-political compatibility with NATO can be 
acquired. 
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4. It can be considered as the first step in the process of comprehensive inclusion in the inte-
grated military and political structure of NATO. 
According to some high official NATO representatives, Slovenia has proved to be a very 
active and reliable partner in the PfPP. Furthermore, Slovenia’s ambition to co-operate with 
NATO was definitely expressed when a separate law was passed by the Slovene Parliament 
(February 1994), which ensures funds for the development of its defense forces from 1994 to 
2003. This law also states that “the arms and equipment procured in accordance with the 
present Law must meet the standards of the NATO defense system.14 
4. Public Opinion on Slovenia’s Foreign Policy Goal of NATO Inclusion 
In a democracy, the popularity and comprehension of political strategy and goals among the 
average citizens can often be measured by public opinion polls. These polls can sometimes 
have a significant cause-and-effect reaction throughout the political spectrum, and can be a 
potent force in determining future strategies. Between December 15, 1994 and January 19, 
1995 a public opinion poll based on a representative sample of 1050 adult Slovene citizens 
was carried out by the Defense Research Center at the Faculty of Social Sciences, University 
of Ljubljana. Although the survey covered many different dimensions of Slovene national 
security (e.g. threats to international security, the formation of Pan-European military forces, 
etc.), the following deals only with the questions which concern Slovenia and NATO. 
The following question were used to identify the viewpoints and the expectations of the re-
spondents concerning this issue. 
i) " Which is the most effective way for Slovenia to provide its future military security?" 
(See graph 1). 
                                                 
14  The Law on the Provision of Resources for the Realisation of Key Development Programmes of Defense 
Forces of the Republic of Slovenia 1994-2003. Official Gazette of the Republic of Slovenia, No. 13/1994. 
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a) by establishing friendly neighbourly 
relations 
b) by means of defense agreements with 
other states 
c) by strengthening the Slovenian army 
d) by strengthening the Slovenian police 
e) by joining NATO 
f) by using its own army in a Pan-Euro-
pean military forces framework 
g) Slovenia is not threatened in a military 
way 
h) do not know/cannot tell 
Source: Defense Research Center, " The National Security of Slovenia", 1994/95. Faculty of Social Sciences, 
University of Ljubljana, Slovenia (DRC, NSS 1994/95). 
It turns out, that the majority of respondents suggest that Slovenia should, to a much greater 
extent, complement the military aspect of its national security with non-military means i.e. 
diplomatic, political and cultural relations (e.g. good neighbourly relations- 75%; defense 
agreements with other states- 50.4%; and admission to NATO- 40.5%). One group of respon-
dents (31%) believed that the strengthening of the Slovene military was the most adequate in-
strument for guaranteeing Slovenia’s military security. 
ii) "The Slovenian state has been persevering in its attempts to be admitted to NATO 
membership. Do you personally support or oppose these endeavours?" (See graph 2) 
 From graph 2 it can be concluded that 8% of the respondents oppose Slovenia's member-
ship of NATO, while 44% support it, and 32.7% neither supports nor opposes this course 
of action. 
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Source: DRC, NSS 1994/95. 
iii) "Slovenia has become an equal partner in the programme "Partnerships for Peace", within 
the NATO framework. Do you think the security situation has improved or worsened?" 
(See graph 3). 
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Source: DRC, NSS 1994/95. 
Only 3% of the respondents estimate that Slovene national security has deteriorated, while 
half of them think that the situation has not changed at all. 
iv) "Evaluations of the advantages and the disadvantages of Slovenian admission to NATO 
vary greatly. Do you, personally, agree with the following statements?" (See graph 4). 
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a) Slovenian reputation in the world 
would grow 
b) the arms importing embargo would be 
lifted 
c) the military security of Slovenia would 
be strengthened 
d) it would mean more money for the 
defense budget 
e) the Slovenian armed forces would 
have better access to modern weapons 
f) Slovenia would find it easier to join 
processes of European integration  
g) NATO military bases would provide 
jobs for the local population 
h) NATO military bases would be a 
threat to the environment 
 
i) the personnel at the military bases 
would present a disturbing social 
factor  
j) the establishment of NATO bases 
would result in a huge loss of territory 
as Slovenia is a small country 
k) Slovenian military forces would be-
come more efficient after their admis-
sion to NATO 
l) with the membership of NATO, 
Slovenian sovereignty would be com-
promised 
m) Slovenian corporations could partici-
pate in military projects of the NATO 
members 
n) membership in NATO might require 
Slovenia to participate in military ac-
tions outside its territories. 
Source: DRC, NSS 1994/95. 
What can be seen from the graph 4 is that the respondents are well aware of both the strengths 
and weaknesses of Slovene membership in NATO. These views are consistent with the latest 
NATO study on expansion according to which each potential member of NATO has to ac-
complish its own cost-benefit analysis and decide whether to join NATO or not. 
v) "The Slovenian state aims to be admitted to NATO, as soon as possible. When, in your 
opinion, will Slovenia actually become a member of the NATO?" (See graph 5). 
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Graph 5 demonstrates that almost 40% of the respondents do not know or cannot make up 
their minds concerning this issue. The rest of the answers are as follows: 10.2% of 
respondents favour 1996 as the earliest date for membership; 31.3% chose 1997 to 2000; 
11.3% think that Slovene membership of NATO will be achieved between 2001 and 2005; 
and 4.5% thought that this was likely after 2005. Of the remaining respondents, 5.2% think 
that Slovenia will never join NATO. 
On the basis of both direct and indirect indicators deriving from the results of this public 
opinion survey, the following can be concluded: 
First: as to how the military security of Slovenia has to be assured, most respondents first and 
foremost stress the means of constructive foreign policy. A strengthening of the Slovenian 
army as a means of assuring military security is avowed by a minority of 30% of respondents. 
In contrast, strengthening good neighbourly relations has priority for 75% of the respondents. 
Second: the results tend to emphasise that there does not appear to be any significant discrep-
ancy between public opinion and the views of the Slovene authorities with regard to national 
security within the European security framework. A more specific question on NATO 
suggests that 44% of the respondents would approve of Slovenian membership, while 9% 
disapprove.15 
Third: it appears that the question of joining NATO is being approached in a realistic way. In 
addition, the public is well aware that within the framework of integration and détente in 
                                                 
15  The question (Do you support the endeavours of Slovene government for inclusion into NATO?) was 
repeated in public opinion survey in October 1996 and the result shows an increased support of the 
respondents (around 68%) for Slovenia's inclusion in NATO (See: Public Opinion and Mass Communication 
Research Center. Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Eurobarometer 2, October 
1996). 
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Europe, there is a real opportunity for NATO to reform and to strengthen, above all, its politi-
cal role. However, on the basis of the results, one can identify a need for the Slovene popula-
tion to be promptly and thoroughly informed concerning all of the advantages and disadvan-
tages which full membership in NATO will bring. Only then will the young Slovene state be 
able to provide the necessary political and cultural framework within which the equilibrium 
of public values and beliefs, the political regime and the national security system can operate 
on a basis of mutual trust. 
5. Conclusion 
The national security policies of modern states are not only related to the pursuit of national 
interests, but also to the influences of the international security environment. The transition to 
the post-cold war security environment in Europe presents an opportunity for the 
development of a comprehensive pan-European security order, based on common values and 
a code of conduct, which would express a desire to use peaceful means in conflict resolution 
within and between states. The creation of a new European security order on the basis of the 
above mentioned values and principles is not a simple straight forward process, but is 
accompanied by difficulties, new conflicts and uncertainties. Nevertheless, the prevailing 
trend toward co-operation and continued economic and political integration as well as several 
existing multilateral institutions in Europe now offer regional states, and especially smaller 
ones, an opportunity to participate in the decision-making process on political and security 
affairs in Europe.16 Therefore, the creation of a new security order throughout Europe should 
be an element of the national security policies of all states, particularly the smaller ones. By 
definition every small state has limited resources and therefore must shoulder the burden of 
its own military-defense obligations before relying upon potential co-operation and aid from 
other states or supranational security organisations. Only after they reach an adequate degree 
of their internal stability and security, can smaller states act as sovereign and reliable partners 
in the international community. Nevertheless, the small states should develop their national 
security structure in a way that opens the possibility for their eventual inclusion into a larger 
security system. 
Military intervention in Slovenia by the YPA in 1991, the attempt to settle the entire 
Yugoslav crisis by arms, as well as the inefficiency of the existing international security 
mechanisms and instruments in dealing with this crisis, have brought about the recognition 
that Slovenia needs to ensure its national security with both military and non-military 
instruments organised into a new national security system. Moreover, it is of utmost 
importance for Slovenia as a small state to join the integrational processes and design its 
national security structure for inclusion into the larger evolving multi-institutional European 
security structure. Since NATO has the necessary operative military-defense capabilities to 
successfully provide collective defense for its members, it is a very attractive military-
political organisation for most of the post-socialist countries. 
                                                 
16  Allen Sens, op. cit., p. 77. 
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Unlike other Central-Eastern European former socialist countries, Slovenia had never been a 
member of the former Warsaw Pact. Due to its substantial success in its transition to a 
democracy (economic and political stability, establishing democratic civil-military relations 
and defensive military force, etc.)17 as well as its significant progress in terms of co-operation 
with Western institutions, one would assume that NATO will offer Slovenia an opportunity to 
become a full member as soon as possible. 
Indeed, the best way for NATO to prove its credibility and justify its continued existence is to 
permit new members to join, with stable and reliable partners invited first. 
As for Slovenia’s role in a pan-European security structure and NATO enlargement, it is pres-
ently of primary importance to reach broader social consensus among its population for its 
political decision to become a full member of NATO. 
 
                                                 
17  As far as the domestic economic situation is concerned, some of the main macroeconomic indicators of the 
Slovene economy are as follows: a) GDP per capita (in US $): latest: 9.663; compared to one year ago: 
9.352. b) Foreign exchange reserves: latest: 3,5 billion US $, sufficient to finance four months of imports 
and 15 per cent in excess of total foreign debt; compared to one year ago: 3,4 billion US $. c) Inflation, at the 
end of the year: latest: around 10 per cent; compared to one year ago: around 18 per cent. d) Standardised 
rate of unemployment (ILO definition): latest: 8 per cent; compared to one year ago: 7,4 per cent. For more 
information see: IMAD, Slovenia Economic Mirror, Vol. 11, No. 7, p. 30, July 1996 and Paul Phillips and 
Bogomil Ferfila, The First Five Years. Slovenia. Quarterly Magazine. Vol. X, No. 2 (1996), pp. 4-8. 
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Summary 
Introductory Remarks 
As a newly established nation-state Slovenia continues to develop concepts, policies, and 
institutions to provide for its national security. She does so as a young country in a new 
Europe and must consider not only her own experiences, principles, and international politics, 
but also the dynamic environment of the multifaceted proposals and efforts at European 
integration. These are the basic considerations for understanding the process whereby 
Slovenia is forming a new national security network, both internally and on the international 
level, and also for following Slovenia’s endeavours to participate in the European integration 
process and join NATO and the European Union. 
Findings 
1. Slovenia must look at developments in the newly evolving European - and indeed global - 
security environment in addition to her own needs as she continues to define a national se-
curity framework, since by definition such policies and institutions are inherently linked to 
those on an international scale. 
2. From the outset of modern Slovene independence, the desire to thoroughly reorganise the 
country’s socio-political institutions and to reform the national security system was unani-
mous among, and clearly expressed, by practically all the competing political parties in 
parliament. The basic issue of whether to reorganise the Slovene army or in fact to 
demilitarise the country, has however remained a divisive issue in government and in 
public. 
3. The new Slovene constitution of December 1991 embodied seven basic changes affecting 
the national security system. These involve the beginning of a multi-party parliamentary 
democracy, division of power between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of 
government, increased governmental authority over military budget and activities, 
reorganisation of the Defense Ministry as well as consolidating the army, abolishing all 
laws giving the military autonomy in key social and political areas, and abolishing 
“special” military schools which previously took the place of public high schools and 
university. 
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4. These reforms eliminate the privileged relationship the military used to enjoy with the 
leading government party and end political and religious discrimination from military life. 
They also have the impact of making the Slovenian military corps more socially 
representative in terms of gender, religion and social origin. 
5. The military is now completely under civilian control, modelling those of developed 
parliamentary governments, and is more transparent in terms of access by parliament, the 
media, academia and the public. The new organisation also ensures that military leadership 
is under the highest national representative power, that all national security decisions are 
made by parliament while the military itself is limited to an executive role, and otherwise 
depoliticized. 
6. Problems have, however, arisen in Slovenia’s transition of civil-military relations in 
building the new national security framework. They stem from delays in adopting new 
legislation and ambiguous accountability of state legal institutions to parliament and the 
public concerning national security affairs. These conditions, in turn, are symptomatic of 
antagonistic and immature Slovene politics, in which a newly emerging elite is still torn by 
internal strife, and in which civil and professional elements of society still lack substantial 
influence. 
7. On the international level, Slovenia has adopted co-operation instead of competition as a 
primary strategy for solving international problems. Locally, Slovenia has striven aggres-
sively to improve relations with neighbouring states. While largely successful in this effort, 
two key issues yet unresolved involve Italian “optant” claims for property rights in 
Slovenia and border issues with Croatia. 
8. Despite political squabbling and some public uncertainty, there is general consensus to 
move in direction of European integration, namely the EU and NATO. This is in fact 
Slovenia’s priority goal in her foreign policy, which officially commits the country to the 
peaceful resolution of interstate conflicts but to defend itself with arms if attacked, alone, if 
necessary. Slovenia has expressed vigorous support for NATO’s Partnership for Peace 
Programme, and her defense establishment is most interested in its opportunities for 
officers education and training, modernising personnel organisation and aligning it with 
NATO convention, building a NATO-compatible communication system, participation in 
joint/combined exercises, and establishing a dedicated international co-operation unit in 
the military. The Slovene parliament passed legislation further supporting NATO and PfPP 
activities by providing funds to develop its defense forces and to ensure, that its equipment 
is NATO compatible. 
9.  Slovenia sees the benefits of co-operation in the PfPP in an improved psychological sense 
of security for the nation, participation in joint operational planning, developing a modern 
military defense structure and procedures compatible with NATO’s, and eventual inclusion 
in an integrated pan-European military and political structure. 
10.The Slovene public is well aware that within the framework of integration and détente in 
Europe, there is a real opportunity for NATO to reform and to strengthen its security role . 
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In addition, the Slovene public wants to be promptly informed on both the strengths and 
weaknesses of Slovenia's membership in Nato. 
 
